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1. Introduction
Given the great importance of collective bargaining for wage-setting in 
Europe, it is all the more astonishing that, even today, there is no offi -
cial Europe-wide database or statistics on collectively agreed wages. The 
only exception is the indicator of negotiated wages, which is calculated 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) as an aggregate fi gure for the whole 
euro zone (ECB 2002). Because the ECB does not publish the underly-
ing national data, the ECB indicator of negotiated wages contains only a 
rough calculation at a highly aggregated level, with no information that 
would make possible a European comparative analysis. The indicator is 
considered by the ECB itself to comprise ‘experimental data’: that is, sta-
tistics that are not yet fully developed in terms of coverage, rely on some-
what different source data, are not based on euro area–wide harmonised 
defi nitions or rely heavily on estimation techniques using substantial 
assumptions. There is also an annual report on pay developments in 
Europe published by the European Industrial Relations Observatory 
(EIRO) of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions, which includes data on collectively agreed wages 
(for the latest issue see Cabrita and Fric 2012). 
In response to the problems posed by the fi nancial and economic crisis, 
the European Union has meanwhile put forward a new series of poli-
cies better known as European economic governance. As emphasised in 
the Euro Plus Pact, wages and collective bargaining systems are seen as 
one of the main instruments for the European coordination of economic 
policy. Recommendations on wages can be traced in the EU 2020 rec-
ommendations of the ongoing European monitoring of national reform 
programmes and in the in-depth country reports of the macroeconomic 
imbalances procedure. Although there is still heated discussion of the 
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status and content of these recommendations – especially at the Euro-
pean trade union side – such a policy turn necessitates reviewing and 
improving the available comparative information for European policy-
makers and social-partner organisations. Therefore, a quality review 
and assessment of comparative statistics on collective agreed wages 
seems urgently needed.
The ECB’s quarterly indicator of negotiated wage rates in the euro zone 
is based on non-harmonised data from 10 countries. However, the fi g-
ures from Slovenia and France are based on national indicators of actual 
wage increases. The present chapter compares the design and quality of 
the available indicators of collectively-agreed wages for the other eight 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Por-
tugal and Spain. These countries, which belong to the euro zone, have a 
clearly available indicator. Our comparison also digs out the available 
data for France. The indicators play a dominant role in the recent annual 
EIRO reports on collectively agreed pay (Cabrita and Fric 2012).
The quality concept applied in this chapter is in conformity with the defi -
nition developed by the European Statistical System (Eurostat 2009). 
The following quality dimensions are distinguished in this approach: 
relevance, accuracy, timeliness and punctuality, accessibility and clar-
ity. Each of the quality components will be explained briefl y at the start 
of the relevant section. Our main sources are individual quality reports, 
delivered by national experts during the spring and summer of 2012.1 In 
drafting these quality reports, the experts contacted between two and 
fi ve statistics stakeholders (trade unions, ministries of labour or statisti-
cal offi ces). 
Guy Van Gyes and Sem Vandekerckhove
 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance 25
2. Designs and methodology
National indicators of collectively-agreed wages can be divided in two 
types. On one hand, they can be related to pay levels, on the other hand 
to pay increases. 
However, the fi rst type of indicator is, in the countries of study, not avail-
able or limited to a database, and not summarised in an aggregated sta-
tistical index. Only Italy and Portugal are exceptions to this (see Table 1).
As a result, we shall focus on the available indicators of pay increases. 
Table 1 National indicators or databases of collectively-agreed pay levels
Indicator (or database) Comment
BE (Juridisk) Only (legal) database; privately-owned; access fee 
DE (WSI Tarifarchiv) Only database; privately owned; accessible
ES (REGCON database) Only database; Ministry of Employment and Social Security
FR Not available Database of sectoral agreements reported to the Ministry; ad 
hoc studies; DARES and DGT of the Ministry of Labour, Em-
ployment and Health; no access; DGT publishes an extensive 
annual report on collective bargaining
IT Nominal wage amount 
fi gures
ISTAT; published on quarterly and annual basis; annual nation-
al collectively agreed wage levels by accrual and cash value
NL Not available FNV trade union confederation and AWVN employers’ organi-
sations maintain database. The former is accessible via AIAS/
University of Amsterdam
AT (KV-System) Only legal database; privately owned; access fee
PT (Database of collective 
regulations)
Database of collective agreements and in 2011 for the fi rst 
time section in annual report on average collectively agreed 
wage level; DGERT Ministry of Economy and Labour
FI Not available Ministry of Justice maintains a database (FINLEX) that 
also contains collective agreements (that have been legally 
extended)
Source: CAWIE national reports.
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2.1 Basic defi nition
Indexes of collectively-agreed wages measure the proportionate, or per-
centage, changes in a set of prices over time, wages being the price of la-
bour. A price index is typically assigned a value of unity, or 100, in some 
reference period and the values of the index for other periods of time are 
intended to indicate the average proportionate – or percentage – change 
in prices relative to this base. However, the index is limited to changes 
in employee compensation agreed in a collective way, namely in a col-
lective agreement. The ILO Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining 
Convention (No. 98), 1949 describes collective bargaining as ‘Voluntary 
negotiation between employers or employers’ organisations and work-
ers’ organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions 
Table 2 National indexes of collectively-agreed pay increases, euro zone
Publisher Name
BE Federal Ministry of 
Employment, Labour and 
Social dialogue
Index of the collectively agreed wages (Indexcijfer van de 
conventionele lonen/indice des salaires conventionnels)
DE Federal Statistical Offi  ce 
(Destatis)
Index of agreed earnings (Index der Tarifverdienste)
ES Ministry of Employ-
ment and Social Security 
(MEYSS)
Statistics on collectively-agreed wages (Estadistica de Con-
venios Colectivos de Trabajo, ECCT)
FR Ministry of Labour, 
Employment and Health 
(DARES-DGT)
Average annual change of collectively agreed wages (Evolu-
tions annuelles du salaire conventionnel)
IT Italian statistical offi  ce 
ISTAT
Index numbers of the collectively agreed wages (Indici delle 
retribuzioni contrattuali)
NL Statistics Netherlands 
(CSB)
Collective Labour Agreement Wage Indexes (CAO-lonen 
indexcijfers)
AT Statistics Austria Index of collectively agreed minimum wages (Tarifl ohnindex)
PT Ministry of Labour 
(DGERT)
Annualised weighted average variation between wage tables 
(Variação salarial nominal média ponderada intertabelas 
anualizada, VMPI)
FI Statistics Finland Index of negotiated wages and salaries
Note: It is important to note that Germany also has other indicators. The WSI collective agreement 
archive publishes collectively agreed pay increases and annual increases in collectively agreed basic 
pay. The German Central Bank also produces an index on collectively agreed pay. For further infor-
mation see Germany’s national CAWIE report (Bispinck and Schulten 2012).
Source: National reports CAWIE project.
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of employment by collective agreements’. Collective bargaining may take 
place at the national, sectoral or company level. In no European country 
is it found exclusively at one level. However, in most euro-zone member 
states strong trade unions and employers’ organisations have resulted in 
many agreements being concluded at the national or sectoral level, sup-
plemented by some company-level bargaining.
The existing indexes of collectively agreed pay increases focus on the 
average nominal (basic) pay increase as set by collective agreements 
for full-time workers. Two basic questions determine the content of the 
indicator:
(i) What set of agreed pay increases or collective prices of labour is cov-
ered by the index?
(ii) How are the price movements averaged?
Coverage and weighting, in other words, are key features of this kind 
of index (see below). But fi rst we shall look at the national origins and 
uses of indicators.
2.2 Origins and uses
Five of the nine indicators are developed and published by the offi cial 
national statistical agencies (Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands). The four others are maintained by the ministry of labour. 
The Dutch CSB publishes (since 1926) the ‘indexcijfers van regeling-
slonen’ (index of regulated wages). Statistics Finland and the Italian 
ISTAT started to calculate their indexes in 1938. Others commenced in 
the 1950s (for example, Belgium) and the 1960s (for example, Austria). 
Spain and Portugal introduced their indexes in the 1980s. The French 
Ministry of Labour developed its database only recently. The German 
statistical offi ce expanded and modernised the calculated index mark-
edly in 2010. It has data going back to 1995.
The principal use of the indexes of earnings is to serve as background 
material for the social partners in the process of collective bargaining. 
It provides information on past earnings, facilitating the search for a 
common understanding of past and future earnings trends. However, 
the CAWIE national reports mention that wage-bargaining targets more 
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often depend on actual parameters, such as profi ts, productivity, and 
infl ation. 
The original use of indexes, however, was related to the income-
policy perspective. First, the indicators were used to monitor whether 
the price of labour – or rather, labour income – was following the (‘oth-
er’) consumer price index. Second, they have served as a reference point 
to increase certain social benefi ts. The Finnish index, for example, plays 
a role in the calculation of pension rights. Comparable examples are also 
found in other countries. Wage replacement payments for Altersteilzeit 
– a scheme partially to compensate eligible employees who reduce their 
working time as they approach retirement age – in Austria are increased 
according to increases in the Tarifl ohnindex. In Belgium the index is 
used, for example, in specifi c accommodation contracts to determine the 
rent increase.
In recent times the macroeconomic perspective has become increas-
ingly relevant. The index has always been used in a number of countries 
in economic forecasts because it is a timely measure of wage develop-
ments. It is published frequently (monthly and quarterly). Other wage 
data are available only with some time lag. It is this characteristic in par-
ticular that the ECB also fi nds attractive. This timeliness makes the data 
very useful for monitoring and forecasting wage developments within 
the framework of the broader macroeconomic forecasting that the ECB 
needs in order to meet its (infl ation-related) monetary-policy obliga-
tions.
This macroeconomic perspective has increased in importance due to the 
current European focus on competitiveness and the limiting new frame-
work of euro monetary unifi cation for national policies. In this perspec-
tive, wage ‘moderation’ is considered an important policy instrument, 
which has brought increased attention to bear on wage-setting systems 
and collective bargaining (the Euro Plus Pact is a recent instance of this). 
A specifi c example of redirected attention is Belgium’s introduction of 
a wage norm. The Belgian state tries to balance the automatic indexing 
of wages and sectoral bargaining with a strict law on monitoring and in-
tervention in the wage-setting system. The 1989 law on the competitive-
ness of the economy (1989-01-06/31) authorises government interven-
tion if average overall wage increases result – based on past performance 
– in an upsurge in relative labour costs and a deteriorating external 
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performance on the part of private sector companies. The 1989 law was 
extended in 1996 (1996-07-26/32) to enable the government to moni-
tor the wage bargaining process even more closely. The most important 
changes with regard to the 1989 law were a shift from an assessment 
of labour costs based on past performance to one that predicted future 
performance, and the number of countries used as a benchmark was re-
duced to three. The forecast weighted rises in foreign hourly labour costs 
(a weighted average for France, Germany and the Netherlands) now act 
as an upper limit (termed the ‘wage norm’) for wage negotiations at all 
levels (macro, sectoral and company). The lower limit remains the auto-
matic price index.
In sum, fi rst users are ministries, employers’ organisations, trade un-
ions, the political sphere, the academic community and macroeconomic 
institutions. Secondary users are employers and private users (compare 
the use in the price escalator clauses of contracts). Countries such as 
Germany, France, Spain and Portugal also publish basic information 
concerning the indexes – namely the agreed pay increases of individual 
collective agreements – as a service to employers and employees. They 
do this electronically and/or in a journal. Belgium has comparable plans 
for the near future.
2.3 Method of calculation
Choice of index numbers
Two basic approaches can be discerned in the current indexes.
(i) Main approach: Laspeyres price index
A majority of the indicators can be defi ned as Laspeyres indexes. This ap-
plies to Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands.
The purpose of these indexes is to compare the aggregate values of col-
lectively-agreed wages in two time periods. These values include a price 
and a quantitative element. A change in wage costs can be attributed to 
an increase of the wage (price element), but also to a change in how many 
workers receive this wage (quantity element). The constructed indexes 
are intended to measure the price component, just like the consumer 
price index measures the price component of the change in household 
consumption expenditure. Measuring or focusing on the price element 
means that indexes are constructed to capture the change in average 
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collectively-agreed pay, holding quantities constant. This set of quanti-
ties can be described as the ‘basket’ of collectively-agreed wages that is 
compared.
The period whose quantities are used in the index can be described as 
the weight reference period. In most of the studied indexes period zero, 
or the reference period, is also used as the weight reference period. As 
such, the constructed indexes belong to the group of so-called Laspeyres 
indexes. This might be formulated as follows:
 
The values indicate a relative change but not absolute values (that is, one 
price index value can be compared to another or a base, but the number 
alone has no meaning). An index picks a base year for which its value is 
set to 100.
As can be seen from the defi nition, if one already has pay and quantity 
data for the base period, then calculating the Laspeyres index for a new 
period requires only new data on the pay increase. Therefore, calculat-
ing the Laspeyres index for a new period tends to require less time and 
effort.
Table 3 Base reference period used in 2012 for calculating Laspeyres 
indexes
Publisher Name
Belgium 1997 Base period irregularly revised (future plan every 10 years)
Germany 2005 Weight reference period = 2006; revision aft er 5 years
Italy 2005 Revision aft er 5 years
Nether-
lands 
2000 Revision aft er 10 years
Austria 2005 Weight reference period = 2006; revision every 10 years
Finland 2005 Revision aft er 5 years, starting in 2010 
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The Finnish index has a slightly different approach. The index of negoti-
ated wages and salaries measures the effect of collectively-agreed pay 
rises on the average regular pay rises. The index is, as such, calculated as 
a chained index using the same weight structure as in the (actual) wage 
and salary index. The effects of negotiated pay rises are estimated in re-
lation to the earnings level as at the previous year-end.
(ii) Alternative, simplifi ed approach
The Spanish and Portuguese indicators are constructed in a different 
way. The two countries’ ministries of labour publish monthly overviews 
of the wages laid down in newly signed collective agreements. By way 
of synthesis they calculate an average of these agreed wages. In Spain 
this is done in a cumulative way, resulting in an average agreed wage 
increase for all reported collective agreements that year. Once a collec-
tive agreement is signed, each of the bargaining or peer committees (at 
sectoral, provincial or company level) must fi ll in a statistical sheet to be 
attached to the agreement when recorded at the Collective Agreement 
Registry. In the sheet the bargainers have to indicate the agreed wage 
increase as a percentage and the employees covered. This information 
is used to obtain the average increases. The French approach, still be-
ing developed, currently focuses mainly on calculating average annual 
collectively-agreed pay increases by branch. An average is calculated for 
the whole economy. 
Coverage
Wage defi nition
Key to the calculation is of course what kinds of pay element are included 
in the index. In most countries index calculations take into account a 
broad defi nition of earnings (see Table 4). 
As such, the defi nitions can be situated between the two concepts used 
internationally in wage statistics on pay (ILO 1973):
(i) The concept of wage rates is related to basic prices of a unit of labour, 
before adding any bonuses for overtime, shift work or family allow-
ance, and before deducting contributions for social security and ad-
vanced tax payments. Wage rates can be expressed in units of time, 
such as an hour, a week, a month or as piece rates. It is the narrowest 
of all pay concepts and applies to workers in paid employment only.
(ii) The concept of earnings typically relates to the pay that employers 
directly give to their employees on a regular basis during a specifi ed 
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Table 4 Wage defi nitions of national indicators of collectively-agreed pay 
increases
Wage defi nition
BE Base wage; does not include bonuses such as premiums, year-end bonuses and holiday 
allowances; factors included are wage increases due to automatic indexation, collec-
tively agreed and working time revisions for workers with an hourly pay base. Seniority 
increments are not included, but are taken into account in the weighting procedure of 
averaging.
DE Agreed earnings; not included are individual bonuses and premiums, one-off  payments, 
fl at rate payments and remuneration in excess of agreed earnings.
FR Level of and increases in the minimum wage, which forms the content of sectoral col-
lective agreements in the French wage bargaining system. This minimum wage can be 
a ‘hierarchical’ wage (salaire hierarchique) or ‘guaranteed’ wage (salaire garanti). The 
former are hourly or monthly wages which are close to the minimum wage, including 
basic pay, production or individual performance bonuses and benefi ts in kind. Guaran-
teed wages are monthly or annual wages whose defi nition is broader than the previous 
one and includes certain benefi ts, such as a seniority premium or bonuses related to 
working conditions.
ES The wage increase considered is the increase in the base salary (without bonuses). 
Nevertheless many collective agreements refer to increases in total salary.
IT Basic pay; seniority allowances; shift  work allowances; all bonuses specifi ed in national 
agreements and payable to all workers (but not one-off  payments), as well as those 
paid periodically (for example, thirteenth-month payment as end-of-the-year pre-
mium).
NL Collectively agreed wages, including specifi c remuneration: gross wages for regular 
working hours of full-time employees; all binding prescribed, regularly prescribed 
paid benefi ts; all binding prescribed, special (non-monthly) benefi ts, such as holiday 
allowances or end-of-year payments. Excluded are allowances only for specifi c worker 
groups or individuals, such as age allowances, shift  allowances, or strictly individual pay 
increases.
AT Included in the wage are all regular payments that are conditional on the job the per-
son holds. Not included are payments that are conditional on personal circumstances 
of a particular person, such as special payments for parents, payments for special occa-
sions, jubilee premia and so on. The wage also does not include wages paid in kind, due 
to the diffi  culty of attaching a monetary value to them. In most collective agreements 
wages are usually fi xed in monetary terms while admissible deductions for in-kind 
rewards, such as food or housing, are fi xed in the contract.
PT Basic rates as defi ned in the wage tables annexed to the collective agreements.
FI Increases in gross average earnings for regular working hours in sectoral collective 
agreements. The earnings concept includes one-off  payments based on the relevant 
collective agreements. Compensation for overtime, holiday pay and other such items 
are not included.
Source: CAWIE national reports.
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reference period. It includes basic pay for time worked or work done, 
as well as for time not worked, such as holidays and sickness. In ad-
dition, it includes other payments granted by the employer for vari-
ous reasons, such as: overtime work, unsocial hours or schedules, 
diffi cult work, regular bonuses and fringe benefi ts, such as family al-
lowances. On the other hand, it excludes all irregular bonuses, even 
if provided by the employer. Earnings are, like time rates, recorded 
gross of social security contributions or tax deductions.
The latter concept refers also to the gross earnings statistics published 
by Eurostat, referring to EU 1738/2005 of 21 October 2005. Gross earn-
ings in this defi nition cover remuneration in cash paid directly by the 
employer, before tax deductions and social security contributions pay-
able by wage earners and retained by the employer. All bonuses, regard-
less of whether they are regularly paid (such as thirteenth or fourteenth 
month pay, holiday bonuses, profi t-sharing, allowances for leave not 
taken, occasional commissions and so on) are included.
The defi nitions used by Belgium, Portugal and Spain are more confi ned 
to the wage rate defi nition. The other defi nitions are closer to the con-
cept of gross earnings, although all exclude some pay elements that are 
included in the actual gross earnings statistics. Overtime pay is always 
excluded. 
Collective agreements included
The pay increases taken into consideration in Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France and Italy are limited to sectoral or branch agreements. This bar-
gaining level is dominant in these countries; nevertheless lower-level 
collective agreements are not included. Portugal and Spain report on the 
average pay increases of all agreements that are mandatorily registered 
at the Ministry of Labour. The Netherlands and Germany work with a 
sample of collective agreements of different levels to obtain representa-
tive coverage. Belgium has plans to include the company agreements of 
large companies in sectors in which the sectoral level is not dominant.
Sectoral/occupational scope
The scope of the index in Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands and Spain is the whole economy. However, domestic help or the 
private households sector is explicitly not included in Italy and Germa-
ny. The Spanish ECCT provides information on all private sector work-
ers (agriculture, industry and services) who are covered by collective 
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bargaining, as well as public sector workers covered by such bargaining 
(public administration, defence, social security, education, health care 
and so on). The scope of the Portuguese, French and Belgian indicators 
is more limited. They do not include public administration (civil serv-
ants). The Belgian index currently excludes also the collective agree-
ments of large (semi-)privatised public enterprises (post, telecommuni-
cations and public transport). The French data exclude agriculture and 
parts of entertainment in their indicator for the private sector.
In most countries the indexes are also available as a national aggregate 
and presented in terms of a sectoral classifi cation. NACE classifi cation 
is common practice. In Austria, Germany, Italy and Spain the informa-
tion is available in terms of NACE-2-digit, while in Belgium, Finland, 
the Netherlands and Portugal it is available at the level of letter codes 
(1-digit). Specifi c classifi cations based on industrial relations practice 
are, furthermore, used in Austria, Belgium, Finland and the Nether-
lands. In France these branches are the only sectoral classifi cation used. 
A total of 278 industries are divided into three overall sectors: metal, 
construction and general.
Occupational classifi cations also play a role in the manner of calcula-
tion. In Belgium the index is calculated separately for blue-collar and 
white-collar workers, which are still recognised as a separate employ-
ment status in labour law. The French indicator deals with blue-collar 
workers (ouvriers), white-collar workers (employés), intermediary pro-
fessions (professions intermédiares) and higher professional and mana-
gerial staff (cadres). Finland and the Netherlands distinguish between 
hourly-paid and monthly-paid employees (which is to a large extent also 
the main division between the blue-collar and white-collar segments in 
Belgium). 
Sampling and weighting
The second important methodological question of the constructed indi-
ces of collectively-agreed wages is related to averaging – the quantity di-
mension of a price index. For the countries producing a Laspeyres index, 
this procedure concerns the base year (see Table 3). Figure 1 summarises 
the approach taken for the Austrian Laspeyres index. 
Population or sampling
It is important in this regard to note that Austria, Belgium, Portugal and 
Spain use the whole population of registered collective agreements. In 
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Belgium and Portugal, however, this population is restricted to sectoral 
collective agreements (see above).
Others use samples of collective agreements. Statistics Austria includes, 
for each of the differentiated sectors – NACE and section of the Chamber 
of Commerce and Trade (WKOe) – the most important collective agree-
ments until at least 75 per cent of the wage earners covered by a branch-
level agreement are included. The Italian ISTAT uses as selection cri-
terion the fact that the pay increases of the leading national agreement 
are taken into account for each sector. As a result, the calculated index 
is based on a sample of 76 leading agreements. For the private sector 
this sample covers 85 per cent of employees. Statistics Finland monitors 
216 base series to construct 70 industry-specifi c indices. In Germany the 
statistics cover at least 75 per cent of people covered by collective agree-
ments in any sector or branch that is included in the index, for both old 
and new Länder. A total of 600 collective agreements are included. The 
Source: CAWIE national report Austria.
Figure 1  Weighting procedure of the Austrian Tarifl ohnindex
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Dutch CSB samples 250 of the approximately 900 collective agreements, 
including all agreements covering at least 2 500 employees. The French 
database monitors all industries with more than 5 000 employees, total-
ling 278 and covering 66 per cent of the French private sector.
Determination of the average wage: weighting within collective agreements
A fi rst step in calculating the average is to determine the average pay 
increase in collective agreements. In the majority of cases, this is not 
diffi cult, namely when the increase is set as a percentage increase for 
everybody covered by the collective agreement. 
The diffi culties start when increases are set not in relative but absolute 
amounts. A 5-euro increase in the monthly wage has a bigger propor-
tional impact on lower wages than on higher wages. One complication 
occurs when a wage increase is granted only to certain wage categories. 
This can happen because a certain occupational group needs a higher 
increase due to labour shortages or to make the occupation more attrac-
tive. Another possibility is that lowest wages are subject to a higher in-
crease. This happens, for example, in countries with a national minimum 
wage, although infrequently. The lowest wages in a collective agreement 
might, as a result, be below this minimum wage and must be raised to 
comply with the law. This has happened in France, for example, in recent 
years (André 2011).
Different approaches have been developed to handle the issue of de-
termining the average pay increase within a collective agreement. The 
Spanish method is fairly straightforward, but also very ‘subjective’: bar-
gainers complete a statistical sheet and this is one of the questions they 
have to answer. The Belgian ministry has, through its social security 
data, information on how many people are covered by a collective agree-
ment, but lacks information on the distribution of these wage earners 
over the cells used in the wage tables of the collective agreement. It uses, 
as a consequence, a ‘rough’ construct, namely the median pay of all wage 
categories or the mean overall pay levels in the different categories. The 
latter is done when a sophisticated occupational wage classifi cation sys-
tem is used (including seniority increments per wage category).
The Portuguese have a fairly comprehensive method. For each collec-
tive agreement the average pay increase is calculated on the basis of 
a comparison of pay levels in the respective wage tables (present and 
earlier agreements). The weight of each wage group in the average of 
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an agreement is calculated on the basis of statistical employment data 
provided by the statistical offi ce of the Ministry of Labour (GEP). These 
employment data are drawn from the annual company survey (Quad-
ros de Pessoal) carried out by the Ministry of Labour. Companies are 
legally obliged to answer this survey and therefore the coverage tends to 
be complete.
The Italian statistical offi ces uses survey data, administrative fi gures 
and information provided by interviewees of employers’ organisations 
to weight FTE employment by job levels and average for each agreement 
(the 76 national sectoral agreements monitored) the index by broad cat-
egories of occupation (blue-collar, white-collar and complex). 
The French system monitors 278 branches. The weighting is organised 
on the basis of the tri-annual ACEMO survey on the development of 
monthly base wages. The year 2008 is currently used as the reference 
period. In this survey covering more than 200 000 enterprises and 12 
million wage earners, employers with more than 10 employees have to 
indicate for three skill levels of four occupational categories (blue-collar, 
white-collar, intermediate profession and cadres) the base wage and the 
number of people. For each of the 12 socio-professional categories, the 
company can choose a reference job position to answer the wage ques-
tion. This information is then used to select reference wages in the wage 
tables of the collective agreement. The lowest wage category in the table 
is accorded to skill-level one, the highest wage category to skill-levels 
two and three, for each of the four occupational categories (when in-
cluded in the agreement). When different types of wages are agreed for 
this wage category, the so-called ‘salaire hièrarchique’ is selected. The 
employment fi gures of the ACEMO survey are used to weight wage data 
in calculating the average.
Austria, Germany and the Netherlands apply comparable methods. The 
Dutch CSB monitors 259 collective agreements. The wage tables of these 
agreements contain altogether 28 000 different wage categories or meas-
ure points. Until 2006 the CSB organised a large-scale quarterly/annual 
company survey on employment and wages. Information was collected 
on the contract wage and wage scale. Employment weights for the dif-
ferent wage categories could thus be reconstructed. In a next step the 
statistical offi ce sampled 4 700 of these measure points, guaranteeing 
that at least 60 per cent of the total wage sum is covered for each collec-
tive agreement. Use of the non-selected points is attributed, in the next 
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move, to the ‘nearest’ sampled points. As a result, weighted average pay 
increases for each collective agreement can be calculated by referring 
to the base year information as reference period.2 The German Destatis 
collects the same type of information as part of the Structure of Earn-
ings Survey. The German statistical offi ce uses this information as main 
variable for occupational class (compare ISCO) as part of the individual 
wage information that is asked for concerning the sampled employees. 
The German statistical offi ce thus uses all the wage groups, in contrast 
to the Dutch approach.
Another confusing element is the type of wage increase. The agreed pro-
portional wage increase can be specifi c to the wage level as indicated in 
the wage table of a collective agreement or it can be a general percent-
age increase of the total wage. Both may be the same for an individual 
worker, but also may not. In a range of countries it is common practice 
that some wage increases are limited to wages represented in the wage 
table. However, as the calculated wage increases in the indexes refer to 
the (minimum) wages of the collective agreement tables, this practice 
does not distort calculations. However, conceptually and also for the 
bargaining partners in practice a 2 per cent increase in the total wage is, 
for example, a bigger increase in absolute terms (and cost) than a 2 per 
cent increase in the wage sum reference in the wage table of a (sector) 
collective agreement.
Aggregating average wages: weighting between collective agreements
The next step in calculating the average is the weighting of collective 
agreements. All countries possess employment data by collective agree-
ment. Portugal, France and Germany use mainly (large-scale) survey 
material for this weighting; the Netherlands (since 2006), Finland and 
Belgium mainly administrative data; Austria and Italy a mixture of the 
two. Spain uses self-reported fi gures from the statistical sheets of the 
collective agreement.
Belgium, Germany, Italy and Austria – of the countries working with a 
base year – use only the employment distribution of this base year. The 
Netherlands and Finland adjust these fi gures, although in a different 
2.  The Dutch CSB stopped organising the survey in 2006 and now relies on information from 
the tax administration for such data. These data do not include contract wage information 
related to collective agreements, however.
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Figure 2  Weighting procedures to calculate average pay increase
way. The Finnish statistical agency uses annual changing weights in the 
aggregation of the 216 base series of the industry-specifi c indexes and 
fi xed-weights of the base year for the aggregation to 70 industry-specifi c 
indices. The Dutch statistical offi ce uses changing weights of employ-
ment between collective agreements, but not for the weighting within 
agreements.
Summarised
Figure 2 summarises these weighting procedures for calculating the ‘av-
erage’ increase. Key differences concern whether:
– it is based on a sample or the whole population of covered collective 
agreements;
– it is a base year, current year or a mixture of the two;
– the weighting within an included collective agreement is based on 
the objective collection of employment fi gures by pay scales or based 
on a simple or subjective method.
Population: PT, ES, BE
Sample: All other countries 
Base year: BE, DE, AT, IT
Mix: NL, FI
Current year: PT, ES, FR













Subjective: ES (FI) 
Objective sampling basis:
all other countries 
Employment weight 2:
within collective agreement
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2.4 Periodicity and revisions
Belgium, Finland and Germany publish indexes on a quarterly basis. The 
French data are also quarterly updated, but they are not published regu-
larly (currently usually annually). Italy publishes monthly, quarterly 
and annual data. The annual data are published in March together with 
the monthly data for January and February. Portugal and Spain publish 
monthly averages, which are cumulated in an annual fi gure.
Preliminary monthly calculations are published by Austria and the Neth-
erlands. The Dutch offi ce indicates the number of agreements on which 
the calculation is based and updates it monthly until the fi gures are de-
fi nitive. It also publishes quarterly and annual indexes. Statistics Austria 
takes the same approach, publishing preliminary calculations 15 days 
after the end of the month; the fi nal fi gures come three months later. 
Retroactive revisions, that is, are included only in these three months, 
but for this rule, again, there is an exception for important agreements 
(representing more than 5 per cent of workers covered by the index).
The French data take into account the effective date when the wage in-
crease is foreseen by the agreement. When this date has passed (for ex-
ample, an agreement in November refers already to an increase in Janu-
ary), the signing date is used as the date of implementation. The Italian 
ISTAT, to counter this problem of retroactive wage increases, publishes 
two indicators on pay levels: ‘accrual’ with retroactive revision and ‘cash 
value’, which is what people actually received at the time of payment. 
The Italian index is published monthly and annually.
The Spanish indicators differentiate between ‘agreed’ and ‘revised wage 
increases’. The revised wage increase is the result of incorporating the 
impact of revisions on account of ‘wage guarantee clauses’ to the agreed 
wage increase for the period, in cases when such revisions are retroactive 
whatever the date on which they were actually paid. In other words, the 
result of the revisions is attributed to the year for which they are retroac-
tively calculated (and agreed).
3. Comparative quality assessment
There is no universal defi nition of quality; it is multifaceted and can 
therefore mean different things to different people, depending on the 
Indicators of collectively agreed wages in the euro zone: a quality report
 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance 41
various procedures and products. In relation to statistical output qual-
ity, the European Statistical System’s (ESS) six dimensions of quality are 
generally used: relevance, accuracy, timeliness, accessibility and clarity, 
comparability and coherence. The structure of the section is based on 
this ESS quality concept. Our assessment is organised from a harmoni-
sation perspective. Harmonisation can be defi ned as actions or processes 
that, through matching and blending, bring about agreement, reconcili-
ation or standardisation. Harmonisation is the process of agreeing and 
applying standards that can lead to comparability. Comparability, as we 
have seen, is one of the ESS dimensions of quality. As we embrace the 
harmonisation perspective in this chapter, comparative coherence is of 
course a key aspect of relevance. Thus we fi rst discuss relevance, compa-
rability and coherence combined.
3.1 Relevance, coherence and comparability
Relevance is the degree to which statistics meet current and potential 
user needs. It depends on whether all the statistics that are needed are 
produced and the extent to which the concepts used refl ect user needs.
Changing needs
In the different countries the relevance of the statistics on collectively-
agreed pay increases has been attributed mainly to income policies, in-
forming social dialogue on this issue and linking this information to so-
cial policies. Especially in countries with varied or diffuse agreements at 
different levels (local, regional, national) and demarcations (company, 
sub-sector, sector) and different timings, this reporting is instructive 
for other bargainers (see, for example the examples of the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain). However, it is certainly the case that it is only one 
of the statistics bargainers look at (and probably not the main one). The 
following passage of the French CAWIE report is illustrative in this re-
gard: ‘the main conclusion of interviews with social partners is the weak 
use of French statistical data. At the time of collective bargaining, social 
partners mainly focus on consumer price index, on the minimum wage 
(SMIC) and housing charges. They look at the hourly wage for manual 
worker index (SHBO) which is supplied by DARES publications to un-
derstand the development of the SMIC’ (Delahaie et al. 2012: 10).
This kind of horizontal coordination usage is complemented by a more 
macroeconomic perspective. Evidence of this perspective is most clear in 
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countries where vertical coordination of collective bargaining has been 
strong. Statistics Finland cooperates with the Information Committee 
on Cost and Income Developments, established for four years in Octo-
ber 2008 by the Finnish Prime Minister’s Offi ce (its predecessor was 
the Incomes Policy Settlement Commission.) The Information Commit-
tee prepares economic reports and estimates for collective bargaining 
and decision-making. It also monitors how collective agreements are 
implemented and assesses their impact, taking account of euro-area re-
quirements and labour market stability and functioning. In addition, the 
Committee serves as a discussion forum for assessing the extent to which 
wage formation and collective bargaining can promote employment and 
advance the functioning of the labour market as circumstances evolve. 
The Committee has a tripartite composition. Trends of collectively-
agreed wages in the country and its three main neighbours (France, Ger-
many and the Netherlands) play a dominant role in the technical report 
that the Belgian Central Economic Council publishes each autumn. Eve-
ry two years the Council tries to determine a wage norm to coordinate 
collective bargaining in Belgium. Also in other countries, statistics on 
collectively-agreed pay rises play a role in macroeconomic discussions, 
among other things because of the timely availability of this wage in-
formation in forecasting (by central planning offi ces or national banks).
These macroeconomic purposes of coordination have in recent years in-
creasingly attained a European dimension. Attempts at horizontal co-
ordination, especially on the trade union side, have been developing at 
sectoral level (for example, European Metalworkers Federation, EMF) 
or in neighbouring countries (the Doorn Initiative). Most recently, the 
ETUC, in a 2010 resolution on the coordination of collective bargaining, 
urged trade unions to resist wage freezes and wage cuts in the context of 
tentative economic recovery. It notes that trade unions should refuse to 
bargain arrangements that have the effect of poaching jobs from other 
countries, regions and companies. Within the context of the dominant 
mantra of competitiveness and of euro-zone monetarism, the EU added 
another dimension to this macroeconomic governance in the current 
economic crisis. The European Commission (2010a, b, c) published six 
proposals which make up the economic governance package, empha-
sising the importance of wage-setting mechanisms that allow for ‘com-
petitive wages’ and proposing indicators (the so-called ‘scoreboard’) to 
safeguard this aim (by evaluating wage indexation mechanisms, decen-
tralising bargaining, decreasing wages in the public sector and so on). Fi-
nally, in March 2011 a majority in the European Council (the 17 euro and 
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six non-euro member countries) endorsed a pact on competitiveness, 
now renamed the Euro Plus Pact, which has resulted in a reinforcement 
of fi scal austerity policies and an increase in competitive-wage pres-
sures. In February 2012, the European Council adopted the abovemen-
tioned scoreboard to tackle macroeconomic imbalances.
3.2 Coherence and comparability
From these developing user perspectives, which increase the need for 
European comparison, it is important to note that only nine of the 17 
countries belonging to the euro zone construct this type of index. How-
ever, these countries represent more than 90 per cent of euro-zone GDP; 
only Greece and Ireland, of the countries that constitute more than 1 per 
cent of euro-zone GDP, are missing. A starting base, in other words, is 
certainly available, especially when one considers that a basic approach 
can be detected in the various countries, namely monitoring the trend in 
nominal average pay increases.
It is also important that most of the countries can already produce statis-
tics using the common NACE sectoral classifi cation. France is an excep-
tion. Private sector data are everywhere included. Public sector data are 
missing in Belgium, France and Portugal, however. Employees of private 
households are also not always included (for example, in Germany).
Two fundamental issues, furthermore, have to be dealt with in order to 
make further progress: the lack of a common wage defi nition and meth-
od of averaging hamper coherence and comparability.
Six of the nine existing indicators calculate an average collectively-
agreed pay increase based on a fi xed-weight system with a base year or 
a so-called Laspeyres index. The French have not yet invested adequate-
ly in making average increases available. The Portuguese and Spanish 
ministries take another approach, calculating an average increase in the 
monthly/quarterly/annually published agreements. This is a fundamen-
tally different approach from those of Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germa-
ny, Italy and the Netherlands. The latter countries focus on monitoring 
the collectively agreed pay increase of the average (representative) work-
er. The average worker is constructed by distributing the employment 
of a base year over the wage tables of ‘representative’ collective agree-
Indicators of collectively agreed wages in the euro zone: a quality report
Guy Van Gyes and Sem Vandekerckhove
44 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance
ments, using this distribution to weight the averaging. ‘Representative-
ness’ is linked to the coverage of collective agreements in this base year.
The approach taken by Portugal and Spain looks at the average agreed pay 
increase. The main current approach, however, is a price index, namely 
the price of labour. The difference is best illustrated with a theoretical, 
but illuminating example. When most of the collective agreements in a 
country foresee no wage increase (probably because no agreement will 
be signed) and only one, which covers 5 per cent of employees, foresees 
an increase of 5 per cent, the Portuguese and Spanish indexes would end 
up with a 5 per cent increase (averaged to an annual fi gure). Laspeyres 
indexes, however, would indicate only a 0.25 per cent increase. Of course 
this is a theoretical case, but it shows how sensitive the Portuguese and 
Spanish indicators are to ‘zero’ or ‘no’ agreements. 
The Portuguese and Spanish approaches are, however, better at catching 
new trends in employment. The moment these new sectors are covered 
by a collective agreement, they are included in the Portuguese and Span-
ish indicators. In the price index system, these new agreements would 
only enter when the coverage of the index system is revised. Most price 
index systems are updated every fi ve years. The Dutch system does so 
only every 10 years, but they update the weighting between collective 
agreements on an annual basis.
To conclude, from the ‘price of labour’ perspective, the Laspeyres index 
approach is superior, when a well-developed weighting methodology is 
available.
Another diffi culty with regard to coherence is the varieties of wage defi -
nitions applied. Some focus more on basic wage rates (Belgium, France, 
Spain and, to a lesser extent, Austria), others use a more comprehensive 
earnings defi nition. Peculiarities reign. The German indicator currently 
does not include fl at sum increases (but this will change). Holiday and 
end-of-year premiums also cause confusion. From the macroeconomic 
perspective, it would be advisable to streamline as much as possible the 
wage defi nition with the wage concept of the statistics on actual earn-
ings. For example, in the present Belgian index, the congruence between 
the labour cost indicator and the indicator of negotiated wages is imper-
fect. Some public/private enterprises (for example, postal services and 
telecommunications) do appear in the labour cost index, but negotiated 
wages are not measured. On the other hand, schools are absent from 
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the (private sector) labour cost index, while negotiated wages are meas-
ured. The fi rst of these two issues is purportedly to be resolved. The Ital-
ian CAWIE report (Birindelli and Leonardi 2012) pinpoint the fact that 
labour-cost data are mainly left out of national accounts. These calcula-
tions include estimates for the informal economy, which again makes 
comparison more diffi cult and open to interpretation.
A stress on the macroeconomic perspective would in any case involve 
the broader ILO defi nition of earnings. Also illuminating in this regard 
are Dutch and Finnish practices. The Dutch calculate and publish two 
types of index: regular payments with and without special premiums and 
bonuses. Statistics Finland produces the index of negotiated wages and 
salaries as an organic part of the construction of the index of wage and 
salary earnings. Because wage drift can thus be measured consistently, 
the index of negotiated wages and salaries has been an indispensable 
tool in studies on wage determination in Finland.
From a scholarly perspective a restriction to basic wage rates equates 
the wage drift with the wage cushion. If variable wage components are 
monitored, however, a distinction can be made between uncontrolled 
wage drift (a wage change that was not negotiated) and wage fl exibility 
allowed by the negotiating partners.
3.3 Completeness
The target of calculations and estimations is the average collectively-
agreed pay increase. Besides the already mentioned sectoral ‘gaps’, a key 
issue with regard to completeness is the inclusion of lower-level collec-
tive agreements, in-house company agreements.
The Dutch and German indicators cover this decentralised form of col-
lective bargaining fairly well by sampling collective agreements based 
on an employment threshold. Belgium has plans in the same direc-
tion. Spanish and Portuguese information is also fairly complete in this 
matter. The lowest level of completeness on this issue is found in Italy: 
only leading nationwide sectoral agreements are covered. The territory-
linked bargaining is very partially covered. Collective bargaining at fi rm 
level is absent. As sectoral collective bargaining is still dominant in most 
of the countries, this issue should not be exaggerated. It is nevertheless a 
point of increasing concern (due to decentralisation).
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The issue of time coverage seems to apply mainly in France. Informa-
tion collection for the DGT-DARES database was not always systematic 
before 2003 and the scope of coverage was different: industries covering 
10 000 employees were taken into account (as against industries with 
5 000 employees after 2003). Secondly, before 2003, information on 
wages was available for three occupations only, while four occupations 
are now reported.
We can further conclude that higher-level managerial staff and appren-
ticeships are usually excludes from coverage. The focus is on the average 
pay increase of full-time workers, which is a commendable choice. The 
Spanish ECCT does not provide salary information for different occupa-
tional groups or other job classifi cations (for example, type of contract, 
seniority), because this data is not supplied by all companies and there-
fore is unrepresentative and unreliable.
3.4 Accuracy
The accuracy of statistical outputs in the general statistical sense is the 
degree of closeness of estimates to the true values. Taking into account 
from the previous section the fact that the available indicators do not 
measure the same things in the same way, one could nevertheless argue 
that the measurements are very accurate. There is little criticism of this 
in the countries concerned, except perhaps in Belgium, but there a revi-
sion of the methodology is planned. It is, however, again important to 
stress that part of this high accuracy is obtained by limiting the coverage 
and completeness of the indicator. Limiting it to the basic pay rate and/
or national sectoral level and/or excluding certain sectors/occupations, 
makes the calculations a lot easier and more accurate in a range of coun-
tries, with Belgium again providing an example.
Additional fl aws in accuracy can be detected and we shall focus on some 
sample, coverage and measurement issues.
No sampling errors
Sampling does not play a major role in most of the indexes calculated. It 
is only in the sophisticated indexes of the Austrian, Dutch, Finnish and 
German statistical agencies that sampling plays a role in constructing 
the base reference points or elementary aggregates of the price index. 
Non-probability sampling is the main strategy. One looks at ‘leading’ 
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agreements, the ‘biggest in employment coverage’. Threshold are ap-
plied: coverage of 70 per cent in a sector and the most important pay 
scales. Information for this sampling comes from administrative popula-
tion data or large-scale offi cial surveys to which companies have a legal 
obligation to respond.
One could hypothesise that a focus on bigger, leading agreements has 
the potential to ‘overestimate’ pay increases, because smaller, weaker 
agreements are not included. However, this idea remains speculative as 
no ‘bias’ of this kind is reported in the relevant countries.
Coverage errors in technical details
Coverage errors (or frame errors) are due to divergences between the 
target population and the frame population. Undercoverage is closely re-
lated to the completeness problems already mentioned: not all countries 
cover all agreements and all sectors.
Other possible coverage errors are more probably due to technical de-
tails. 
The fi rst kind have to do with the timing of collective agreements. Agree-
ments can have a multi-annual duration, be retro-active or conditional. 
The indicators that calculate average wage increases and not average 
price increases (see above), particularly struggle with this issue. The 
Spanish ECCT only takes into account agreements with annual econom-
ic effects that are registered with the Labour Authority, but not those 
with ‘ultra activity’. The situation is compounded in the case of multi-
year agreements, which are registered only in the reporting year with-
out annual updates for the duration of the agreement. Thus, the ECCT 
leaves out all agreements that are not newly registered every year (either 
because they are multi-year agreements or because they have to be ex-
tended). Portuguese wage increases are calculated on the basis of the 
agreements published in a determined period (month, quarter, semester 
or year). Different agreements published in the same year may cover dif-
ferent periods. Some may cover 12 months, starting on 1 January, oth-
ers on 1 March, and so forth. Furthermore, there are many agreements 
covering more than 12 months, many of them with a retroactive effect 
of several months or even a year. This raises some problems for the in-
terpretation of the data. The fi rst is that the average increase of wages 
in agreements that were published in a determined year does not refer 
exactly to that year. This is particularly relevant in years with a very long 
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average duration of agreements, for instance 2005 and 2006 (more than 
20 months).
The Dutch CSB solves this by publishing preliminary fi gures and indi-
cating on how many agreements the data are already based. The Italian 
statistical offi ce publishes two indices: accrual (with ex-post revisions) 
and cash values (without).
Another diffi culty with regard to coverage concerns the growing frag-
mentation of collective bargaining in some countries. Opting-out, wage 
cuts or ‘overruling’ of collective agreements by authorities applying g a 
wage freeze cause problems of under-coverage. Until a few months ago, 
the Spanish ECCT, for example, did not generally consider wage cuts, 
which prevented registration of ‘negative increases’. A change in the 
computer software was needed for that purpose, although the effect is 
not yet visible in offi cial statistics. It should also be noted that the ECCT 
does not refl ect recent statutory wage cuts applied by public authorities, 
since wage reductions are incorporated into the database only if they 
have been the subject of discussion and agreement between the parties 
involved in collective bargaining. The agreements still refl ect wage in-
creases that were agreed some time ago and have little bearing on reality. 
In addition, potential improvements on wage levels specifi ed in collec-
tive agreements may be changed unilaterally by employers under the la-
bour reform introduced by Royal Decree-Law 3/2012. The current crisis 
situation highlights an additional problem with the ECCT. Although the 
information is relatively current and regularly updated, wage increases 
for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 may be overestimated for different 
reasons: many agreements for 2010 and 2011 do not yet include any 
clauses on the revision of wage growth relative to infl ation, many others 
have been revised downwards and others are still unknown, since they 
have not been and may never be registered.
The German statistical offi ce is also considering how to integrate the 
growing practice of opting-out in their country.
Measurement errors
Non-universal granting of pay increases and weighting quality
Measurement errors can be considered low as many pay increases are 
granted as a percentage to all workers. But the risk of measurement errors 
rises considerably when only particular groups of workers are assigned a 
(higher) increase or the increase is a fi xed amount and not a percentage. 
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Accuracy depends heavily in these cases on the quality of the weighting 
procedure. Information on employment through the wage tables of col-
lective agreements is the key issue in this regard. Combining different 
sources, Austria, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands manage to collect 
this employment information in a satisfactory way. Germany and Por-
tugal have high-quality information on this matter based on regular, of-
fi cial survey material: the Structure of Earnings Survey in Germany and 
the Annual National Company Survey (Quadros de Pessoal) in Portugal. 
Belgium has the biggest problem here because it lacks employment fi g-
ures from wage tables and as a result uses only a simplifi ed weighting 
(between collective agreements). At the moment, an average (generally 
arithmetic) is taken of all occupations defi ned by the sectoral agreement. 
A major issue is the fact that we have no insight into the extent to which 
the unknown distribution of functions would deviate from such an aver-
age.
The Finnish data rely on ‘subjective’ information from the employers’ 
organisations to obtain the part of pay increases that can be related to a 
negotiated agreement. For each agreement (the base series) the employ-
ers’ organisations provide their estimates about the contribution of pay 
increases concluded in collective agreements. Using this information 
Statistics Finland constructs the base series-level contributions of col-
lectively agreed pay increases and aggregates these increases to sector-
level contributions.
This ‘subjective’ factor plays an even bigger role in the Spanish case. 
One of the main problems of the ECCT concerns the completion of sta-
tistical sheets. In principle, bargaining or peer committees are respon-
sible for fi lling in the data; however, the sheets are often completed 
by the company or even by contracted agents (without being checked 
by workers’ representatives) and that affects the quality and reliability 
of data. Furthermore, it is next to impossible to translate the complex 
details of collective bargaining into a digit in a statistical sheet. For 
example, the agreed wage increase – one of the main results provided 
by the records – is generally considered with regard to the base salary, 
but in many agreements it is based on the total salary and distributed 
through bonuses, or distributed only to certain categories of workers. 
It is therefore diffi cult to obtain a single or generally valid fi gure for the 
wage increase. As a result of poor completion of statistical sheets, the 
information on the number of workers affected by collective bargaining 
is not very reliable in some agreements above company level (as the av-
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erage number of workers per sector is diffi cult to estimate for bargaining 
committees).
As already stated, this measurement problem should not be exaggerated 
as it is confi ned mainly to particular atypical agreements. However, one 
can estimate that this measurement error is bigger in times of economic 
crisis, when these atypical agreements are negotiated more often (for ex-
ample, lump-sum, particular groups receiving different pay increases).
Pending questions on price index methodology
If one goes further into the technical details, one could raise some ad-
ditional questions about possible measurement errors. These questions 
can be formulated by making analogies with similar reported measure-
ment errors of the better known consumer price index (United Nations 
2009; ILO 2004). The questions mainly concern the use of the index 
number formula: a Laspeyres index based on fi xed weights of a base year.
A fi rst relevant shortcoming of CPIs is new product bias. This occurs 
when new goods and services are introduced into the economy but are 
not incorporated into the fi xed market basket of the CPI until much later. 
A ‘bias’ problem is that a large part of the price decline for many of these 
new goods occurs in the early stages of the product cycle, when they have 
not yet been included in the CPI. One could hypothesise that this new 
product – here a new agreement – bias operates in the opposite direc-
tion for collectively-agreed pay. First-time agreements in a (new) sector 
will probably undergo a kind of ‘catch-up’ process. The index indicators, 
using a base year with a fi xed basket of agreements, are here confronted 
with a distortion. The annual averaging Portuguese and Spanish indica-
tors have an advantage here.
A second strongly debated issue in relation to the CPI is ‘substitution 
bias’, which occurs when consumers substitute between types of goods 
and services when relative prices change. A fi xed market basket measure 
such as the CPI assumes that, contrary to standard economic theory, con-
sumers do not substitute comparable products (for example, fast food) 
when the price of one rises relative to the other. It seems safe to argue 
that this kind of substitution effect does not operate with regard to the 
price of labor, but this type of labor index is hampered by a comparable 
effect, namely the composition effect, related to the anti-cyclical evolu-
tion of low-wage employment. When an economy grows, the amount of 
lower-paid jobs (temporary, low-skilled) rises; when an economy enters 
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a crisis, these jobs are the fi rst to go; this is certainly the case in the euro 
zone. Such jobs also characterise the turn from an industrial to a service 
economy.
The ECB (2012) provides proof of this composition effect for actual wage 
developments. The ECB investigated the changes in actual wages for fi ve 
European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Portugal) for 
a period of one or two years between 2007 and 2010. They split the ob-
served wage change into two effects, a ‘prize effect’ which represents a 
real change in wages, and ‘composition effects’. These composition ef-
fects are the effects of changes in (the characteristics of) the workforce. 
For example, during the crisis, in particular workers on low wages 
(young, low skilled) became unemployed, which changed the composi-
tion of the workforce and thus infl uenced the development of the aver-
age wage. When a large part of low wage workers leave employment, it 
is possible that the average wage will increase, even though individual 
wages remain the same or even decrease. This is illustrated by the analy-
ses of fi ve countries. The observed wage change for all countries was pos-
itive. However, when this change is split into a prize effect and composi-
tion effects, a different wage evolution was found. The prize effect was 
negative for four countries and diminished considerably for Portugal. 
Real wages have thus declined in most countries during the crisis years. 
However, large positive composition effects were found for all countries, 
explaining the total positive observed change.
It is probably correct to state that these insights can also be transferred 
to the Laspeyres indexes of collectively-agreed wages. It is important to 
obtain information on what point in the economic cycle the base year 
information is gathered. In periods of severe unemployment, it seems 
fair to assume that a Laspeyres index overstates the ‘average’ price/pay 
increase collectively agreed. The Finnish national expert reports such a 
problem concretely. When the wage and salary earnings index 1990=100 
was calculated, construction had, after the construction boom of the late 
1980s, too great a weight in comparison to the real situation. During the 
depression years of the early 1990s the share of the construction sec-
tor collapsed. A possible solution would be to adopt a Fisher index that 
would take into account the employment distribution weights of the base 
year and the current year. It all depends of course on what one focuses 
on: the trend in the price effect or the trend in the price cost effect. The 
latter is more important from a macroeconomic perspective and neces-
sitates inquiries into the composition effects.
Guy Van Gyes and Sem Vandekerckhove
52 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance
All in all, one should not exaggerate these technical questions. From a 
scientifi c point of view, however, they invite us to further methodological 
research (and possible solutions), as has been done for the harmonised 
calculation of consumer price indexes.
3.5 Organisational quality
The indexes presented are provided by two types of offi cial organisa-
tion: national statistical offi ces (Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands) and the statistics departments of ministries of labour 
(Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain). In general, one can say that the 
organisational quality provided by the statistical offi ces is higher than 
that of the ministries of labour. A release calendar drives timeliness and 
punctuality. Larger and more sophisticated use of internet tools provides 
better accessibility. Nevertheless, the input of labour ministries is essen-
tial to provide expert knowledge on the basic aggregation points, namely 
collective agreements, their pay settlements and their wage tables or pay 
scales.
Timeliness and punctuality
The timeliness of statistical outputs is the length of time between the 
event or phenomenon they describe and their availability. Punctuality 
is the time lag between the release date of data and the target date on 
which they were scheduled.
As already mentioned several times, timeliness is considered an impor-
tant characteristic of the indicators on collectively-agreed pay increases. 
They are praised for this quality. Monthly or quarterly data are available 
that are published very quickly after the end of such a period. Informa-
tion delay depends mainly on how long the bargaining process takes and 
on the procedure for registering and recording the agreement in the da-
tabase of collective agreements. 
We illustrate this delay issue with the Portuguese case. The period be-
tween signing an agreement and its deposit at the Ministry of Labour 
may take some months; the period between deposit and the publication 
in the Bulletin of the Ministry normally takes only a few weeks. The on-
line publication of the DGERT’s ‘Reports on collective work regulation’ 
normally occurs in the fi rst week of the following month. From this per-
spective the source is very prompt. The wage increases stipulated in the 
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collective agreements often refer to periods that start several months be-
fore their signing and subsequent publication. This kind of delay is the 
sole responsibility of the negotiating parties. As an example we might 
consider an agreement that has been signed during a certain period on 
a regular annual basis, always two or three months before the end of the 
year. Thus, the Ministry has always been able to publish the agreement 
before the date the agreement and its wage table came into force (let us 
say, 1 January). In a particular year, negotiations reach deadlock and 
the agreement is signed only in April, that is, several months after the 
end of the validity of the previous wage table (31 December). The new 
agreement includes a wage table whose validity commences on 1 Janu-
ary, several months before the agreement has been signed. This happens 
with some frequency and causes delays in the publication of agreements 
and subsequently of the statistical data on wage increases.
The time lag between the release date of the monthly reports and the 
target date on which they were scheduled for release is very short in Por-
tugal. The indicators of timeliness and punctuality must be considered 
separately for the Italian monthly indexes and for wage level indicators. 
For the indexes, monthly publication is regulated by an annual calendar 
of press releases, made available by the end of one year for the follow-
ing year (that is, by the end of 2011 for the whole of 2012). Their release 
schedule has always been respected. Annual Wage Levels by accrual 
value are generally published in March with reference to the previous 
year. The degree of information completeness/temporariness varies: in 
March 2010, for a series from 2005 to 2009, only the year 2005 was de-
fi nitive. The degree of coverage gradually decreases for more recent data 
(98.9 per cent of employees in 2006 and 2007; 92.8 per cent in 2008 
and 91.6 per cent in 2009). Dutch data are available for each month at 
the beginning of the next month. Due to the use of annual data concern-
ing the distribution of the labour force over the measurement points, the 
fi nalisation of the index lags more than a year behind. By May 2012, the 
index over 2011 still has to be fi nalised.
Accessibility and clarity
The accessibility of statistical outputs is the measure or the ease with 
which users can obtain the data. It is determined by the physical condi-
tions under which users obtain data: where to go, how to order, deliv-
ery time, pricing policy. The clarity of statistical outputs is the measure 
or the ease with which users can understand the data. It is determined 
by the information environment within which the data are presented; 
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whether the data are accompanied with appropriate metadata; whether 
use is made of illustrations such as graphs and maps; whether informa-
tion on data accuracy are available; and the extent to which additional 
assistance is provided by the producer.
A quality difference can be detected in this matter between the statistical 
offi ces and the other sources. Metadata and elaborated methodological 
notes are produced and easy accessible; in particular, the notes from the 
Netherlands and Austria are very detailed (Statistik Austria 2011; van 
den Berg 2004). Destatis, CSB, Statistics Finland, Statistics Austria and 
ISTAT also have extensive possibilities for presenting the data in dif-
ferent ways and with illustrations, such as graphs and maps. More ex-
perienced professional users – the main users of this type of data – are 
certainly better served by these offi ces.
Occasional users will also fi nd publications produced by these offi ces 
with data in static format that are easy to fi nd and interpret. However, 
the French, Portuguese and Spanish ministries of labour are better at 
integrating these indexes in a more global panorama of collective bar-
gaining or wage development. The Portuguese and Spanish labour ad-
ministrations have also invested in internet tools, whereby collective 
agreements and wage tables can also be consulted. Belgium has compa-
rable plans and now provides collective agreements on the website in a 
basic format. Of the statistical offi ces, only the German Destatis presents 
this type of information (in a partial way).
Three more general remarks can be made about the accessibility and 
clarity of the statistics. 
First, transparency on the basic weights is rather low in comparison with 
information available on, for example, the building blocks of consumer 
price indexes. The Dutch CSB is perhaps the most transparent. They also 
indicate clearly the preliminary character of their fi rst calculations by 
indicating how many agreements the calculation is based on.
Second, long-term time-series are not always available. For example, in 
Finland online data by employer sector are available from 2000 and by 
industry from 2005. Data for longer periods are available on request.
Third, statistics are currently to be traced at the national level. The an-
nual reports on pay developments of the European Foundation for the 
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Improvement of Living Conditions refer to these data, but they are not 
collected in a data-fi le format, nor in detailed form presented by sector. 
Again taking the example of Finland: data are available for regular users 
who pay for access to the relevant database (ASTIKA), but currently they 
are not available free of charge through the internet (even though they 
can probably be obtained free of charge upon request). French data are 
only publicly available as part of a written publication. Belgium data are 
available in Excel fi les buried in the website of the Ministry of Labour.
Finally, a series of countries publish data using an occupational classifi -
cation. This is particularly the case in Belgium and France. Others refer 
to monthly-paid and hourly paid occupations (Finland and the Nether-
lands). Others have no such information. From a European perspective, 
this situation blurs the picture.
Conclusion
In this chapter we compared the nine available indicators on collectively-
agreed pay increases in the euro zone. Basic insights have been provided 
into the methods applied. A quality assessment has been conducted using 
the framework of the European Statistical System as guideline. Besides 
direct input for bargainers and being a trend indicator for other income 
policies, the indicators also play an increasing role in macroeconomic 
policies. Methodological accuracy can be considered high when the basic 
information on the employment distribution by wage tables of collective 
agreements is available, one way or another. However, not all countries 
make this type of information available. The Spanish indicator depends 
in this regard on subjective reporting from collective bargainers, Bel-
gium uses for the employment distribution by pay scale a statistical ar-
tefact (the median pay scale). From a comparative point of view major 
challenges include coherence and completeness. Different wage defi ni-
tions are used; one or several indicators are calculated; sectoral coverage 
is not the same everywhere; lower-level collective agreements are not al-
ways included. As such, each of the indicators faces challenges (see Table 
5). The available indicators are, furthermore, split between two funda-
mentally different approaches. The more sophisticated approach is the 
index type, which is comparable with a consumer price index. However, 
pending technical questions can be raised about the current calculation 
method (a Laspeyres index), when taking the composition effects during 
the business cycle in average wage trends into consideration. 
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Taking this quality assessment into consideration, how can we then ar-
gue for stronger harmonisation of these statistical indicators on collec-
tively-agreed pay in the euro zone?
Reasons for developing such a harmonised statistical system for collec-
tively-agreed wages are certainly growing. The evolving coordination 
of collective bargaining in the euro zone forms the basis of these argu-
ments. Due to globalisation, more and more pay bargaining is taking 
place beyond national borders (Glassner and Pochet 2011). In the euro 
zone this (implicit) horizontal coordination is strengthened by the de-
veloping German leadership on wages (Ramskogler 2012). One is also 
seeing more attempts from the union side to develop this kind of coor-
dination (for example, the Doorn Initiative and the collective bargaining 
networks within IndustriAll). As already stated in the introduction, the 
pressure for vertical coordination as part of the new European economic 
governance is also mounting. An evidence-based policy discussion on 
wage setting in the euro zone would be helped by stronger harmonisa-
tion of the available indicators. It is important to know in this regard that 
the European Central Bank is using these data.
Such harmonisation would be best developed step-by-step, given the 
current fragmentation. We distinguish three main steps within this cu-
mulative learning process that would leave space for experimentation 
Table 5 Specifi c challenges of the indicators studied
Challenge
BE (Expected and planned) revision of the basic weighting procedure and other methodo-
logical improvements
ES Quality of the subjective basic data
IT Coverage beyond national agreements
FR Growing into a regular statistical publication
PT Use the data potential to calculate a more sophisticated price index
NL Maintain the data information to update weights of a reference period/base year
AT Inclusion of other forms of remuneration (by extra indices)
FI Increase transparency of basic data collection
DE Maintain coverage of the currently fragmented German pay bargaining system (opting-
out; company-level)
Source: CAWIE national reports.
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and for an informed debate with users: open coordination, minimal har-
monisation and strong harmonisation.
Although only nine of the current 17 euro zone countries calculate a sta-
tistical indicator of collectively agreed pay, this can be considered an im-
portant starting basis. The countries with an indicator cover 93 per cent 
of total euro-zone GDP. Only Greece and Ireland are missing among the 
larger countries (by GDP). The international sector classifi cation NACE 
has broadly been adopted. Databases with high reliability exist on the basic 
raw data, namely pay increases within collective agreements. A key issue 
on the road to more harmonisation is of course the different approach-
es. France, Portugal and Spain monitor average increases in collective 
agreements annually. The other countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) calculate a more sophisticated in-
dex with a base year of the collectively agreed increases in average pay.
In a fi rst step of open coordination the whole group could learn about 
the quality procedures used mainly by the offi cial statistical offi ces in 
the group. Transparency concerning the adopted weight system could 
inspire a mutual learning process. Making reference to each other indi-
cators would also help in this regard. Solutions could be exchanged on 
the accuracy problems that have been dealt with: the threshold for in-
cluding company agreements; the development of more than one index 
to include premiums; how to deal with opting-out clauses in agreements, 
pay decreases, working time changes and retroactive pay deals. Creating 
this European level of statistical exchange and coordination would prob-
ably also help to increase the national attention (in time and resources) 
to tackle specifi c pending methodological issues.
A second level could be defi ned as minimal or weak harmonisation. 
Adopting ‘less is more’ as a pragmatic principle, the countries involved 
would attempt to produce, besides their national practices or needs, a 
Laspeyres index of the average nominal basic pay increases as set by col-
lective agreements for full-time employees. It would involve a collabora-
tion of statistical offi ces and ministries of labour. The focus would be on 
the private sector and the sectoral level (NACE letters) and, as stated, be 
limited to basic pay. Belgium, France, Spain and Portugal have to make 
the biggest efforts to achieve this point of minimal harmonisation.
In a third step it seems feasible to speak or think about strong or maxi-
mal harmonisation. Besides a fast and quarterly availability of the 
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changes in basic pay rates, it would be helpful also to have more compa-
rable indicators on an annual basis about earnings – regular payments 
and special payments. Such data would make it easier to make connec-
tions with actual earnings or compensation data and to make a better 
comparison with labour cost developments possible. One should at that 
moment strive to include private and public sector and lower levels of 
pay bargaining. The step would require a lot of defi nitional work and a 
full investigation of the use of a Laspeyres index or a more elaborated 
form of such indexes (see in this regard the experiences of the Nether-
lands and Finland).
Important drivers of such strong harmonisation could be, on one hand, 
a possible (European) revision of the ILO Resolution on the statistics of 
collective agreements (dating from 1926) and, on the other hand, using 
the European Structure of Earnings Survey as a harmonised database 
for the weighting issue. As already stated several times in this chapter, 
key to calculating a high-quality and robust index of collectively-agreed 
pay increases requires employment data about collective agreements 
and their pay scales. How is the workforce covered by collective agree-
ments; which part of the wage increase is determined by collective 
agreement; and how is the workforce distributed within the pay scales 
of these agreements. The German statistical offi ce uses the Structure 
of Earnings Survey to collect this information. Including questions for 
each sampled individual on their collective agreement and accompany-
ing pay scale also helps the surveyed companies to fi ll in the requested 
data more quickly. Adopting this practice on a Europe-wide scale would, 
on one hand, solve key methodological issues for a lot of countries (see, 
for example, Belgium) and would, on the other hand, almost automati-
cally make strong harmonisation feasible. One could then easily debate 
an extension to other countries.
This step-by-step harmonisation effort would of course also require the 
institutional or organisational leadership of an international organisa-
tion or agencies. Who would take up the challenge: the European Em-
ployment Committee (EMCO), the Economic and Social Committee 
(EESC), Eurofound Dublin, Eurostat, or ILO Europe?
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